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Convenience and Necessity in the Inconsistent 
Legal Treatments of Indian Status 
 
Sterling Paulson* 
INTRODUCTION  
A.  The Cherokee Freedmen Experience  
  The Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations were 
historically referred to by the U.S. Government as the “Five Civilized Tribes of 
Indian Territory.”1 Recognition as a “civilized” people was largely based on 
these tribes’ proficiency in adopting and “[practicing] the white man’s ways and 
[having] their customs.”2 Some of the important touchstones of perceived 
civilization included centralized governments, formal education, conversion to 
Christianity, adoption of the white man’s vesture, individual land ownership, 
and agricultural and industrial production.3 Industry among the tribes 
occurred subsequent to adoption of the white man’s pattern of individual land 
holdings. The advancement of these civilized tribes, in the eyes of the U.S. 
Government, was also driven by the “great aid” of “negro slave labor, and since 
the [Civil War] the freedmen.”4 Of the Five Civilized Tribes, the Cherokees 
                                                 
 
  * J.D., The University of Chicago Law School, 2018. Many thanks to the IJLSE staff for their 
diligence and thoughtful feedback. Any correspondence can be sent to sterlingpaulson@yahoo.com.  
1  Thomas Donaldson, U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, Eighth Census of the United States: Indians. The Five 
Civilized Tribes of Indian Territory, Cherokee Nation, Creek Nation, Seminole Nation, Choctaw 
Nation, and Chickasaw Nation (1893). 
2  Id. at 38.  
3  See id.  
4  Id. The transatlantic slave trade and European practice of African slavery introduced “negro slave 
labor” to Indian tribes. The African slave trade was implemented only after indigenous Indian slave 
labor was found to be insufficient for the needs of European colonists. The commercial aspect and sheer 
scale of this form of slavery was novel to North America. However, “[s]lavery was not new to North 
Americans Indians at contact and most native groups practiced an indigenous form of slavery” in 
which slaves were taken by victorious tribes as spoils of war, or otherwise as direct objectives of 
military action—i.e., for the very purpose of obtaining slaves. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN 
INDIAN HISTORY 47 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 2016). Various tribes also included enslavement as a 
punishment for certain crimes committed by their own tribal members. The role of slaves differed 
between and within tribes. Some slaves were put to the work of forced labor. Others were adopted into 
the tribe, to replace fallen warriors or otherwise increase population. Still others were used as 
sacrifices for religious ceremonies, or became concubines of tribal members. See generally CHRISTINA 
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held the largest number of said “negro slaves,” possessing 4,600 slaves by the 
time of the American Civil War.5 In one of the lost sagas of American history, 
the Cherokee militia, under the direction of the Cherokee National Council, 
hunted down a group of thirty-five such escaped, Cherokee-owned “negro 
slaves” headed for the Mexico border in 1842. As a result of this failed escape 
from bondage, five of the escapees were sentenced to death.6 The escape of the 
slaves was blamed on the influence of free blacks living in and around the 
Cherokee Nation and led to a December 1842 Cherokee law that commanded 
all free blacks to leave the lands of the Cherokee Nation.7  
During the early months of the American Civil War, various Cherokee 
contingencies sided with either the Union or Confederate Armies.8 The 
Cherokee Nation itself initially remained neutral. However, after early 
Cherokee-aided Confederate victories, including the Battle of Bull Run, the 
Cherokee Nation issued its Cherokee Declaration of Causes on October 28, 
1861.9 This declaration announced the Cherokee decision to unite fortunes 
with the Confederacy, like the other Five Civilized Tribes, and to declare war 
on the United States.10 When the Principal Chief, John Ross, turned tide and 
expressed support for the Union, he was forced into exile by Cherokee 
Confederates. However, a group of his loyal supporters called an emergency 
session of the Cherokee National Council in 1863, at which they removed 
Confederates from office, revoked their treaty with the South, pledged loyalty 
to the Union and the United States, and officially emancipated their African 
                                                 
 
SNYDER, SLAVERY IN INDIAN COUNTRY: THE CHANGING FACE OF CAPTIVITY IN EARLY AMERICA (2010). For a 
less-than-authoritative overview of the topic, see also Tony Seybert, Slavery and Native Americans in 
British North American: 1600 to 1865 
https://web.archive.org/web/20040804001522/http://www.slaveryinamerica.org/history/hs_es_indians_sl
avery.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).  
5  See Art T. Burton, OKLAHOMA HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Slave Revolt of 1842, 
http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=SL002 (last visited Sept. 7 2018); see also 
Daniel F. Little Field Jr. & Lonnie E. Underhill, Slave “Revolt” in the Cherokee Nation, 1842, 
AMERICAN INDIAN QUARTERLY NO. 2 (Summer 1977) 121–31.  
6  Burton, supra note 5.   
7  Id.  
8   See The Cherokee and the Civil War, http://www.cherokee.org/About-The-Nation/History/Facts/The-
Cherokee-and-the-Civil-War (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).  For a more in-depth treatment, see Clarissa 
W. Confer, THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE CIVIL WAR (2007). 
9 Cherokee Declarations of Causes (Oct. 28, 1861), http://www.cherokee.org/About-The-
Nation/History/Events/Cherokee-Declaration-of-Causes-October-28-1861. 
10 Id. 
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slaves.11 Nonetheless, Confederate Brigadier General Stand Watie, a 
Cherokee, and his command of combined Cherokee and non-Cherokee soldiers 
persisted in their fight against the Union. Brigadier General Watie was in fact 
the last Confederate General to surrender to the Union.12 In 1866, the 
Cherokee Nation entered into a post-war treaty with the U.S. Government, by 
which they agreed to legally define former slaves as tribal citizens.13 The 
Treaty of 1866 provided that: 
All freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of 
their former owners or by law, as well as all free colored 
persons who were in the country at the commencement of 
the rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may 
return within six months, and their descendants shall 
have the rights of native Cherokees.14 
The Cherokee Constitution was then amended to read: 
All Native Born Cherokees, all Indians and Whites Legally 
Members of the Nation by Adoption, and all Freedmen who 
have been liberated by Voluntary Act of their Former 
Owners or by Law, as well as Free Colored Persons who 
were in the Country at the Commencement of the 
Rebellion, and are now Residents therein … and their 
Descendants who Reside within the Limits of the Cherokee 
Nation, shall be taken, and deemed to be, Citizens of the 
Cherokee Nation.15 
The freed slaves, termed “Cherokee Freedmen,” were long thereafter 
considered members of the Cherokee Nation, even if not considered “Cherokee,” 
and their labor continued to drive the agriculture of the Cherokee.16 Even as 
                                                 
 
11  See The Cherokee and the Civil War, supra note 8. This may have largely been an act of self-
survival, as it occurred after a series of Confederate losses and amidst a sweeping Union invasion of 
the Indian Territory.  
12  See id.  
13  See S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of Freedmen’s 
Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 404 (2007).  
14  CHARLES J. KAPPLER, 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 944 (1904), 
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/che0942.htm. 
15  CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 5 (amended 1866 version) (emphasis added). 
16  See DONALDSON, supra note 1, at 38, 41. Freedmen were similarly recognized as vital cogs of the 
economies of the other Civilized Tribes after the American Civil War.  
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amended in 1975, Article III of the Cherokee Constitution left open tribal 
membership to these Freedmen: 
All members of the Cherokee Nation must be citizens as proven 
by reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls, including the 
Delaware Cherokees of Article II of the Delaware Agreement 
dated the 8th day of May, 1867, and the Shawnee Cherokees 
as of Article III of the Shawnee Agreement dated the 9th day 
of June, 1869, and/or their descendants.17 
The Dawes Commission Rolls included as citizens not only those who 
were “Cherokee by Blood,” but also “Cherokee Freedmen,” “Delaware 
Cherokee,” and “Intermarried Whites.”18 The Delaware Cherokee had 
Delaware Indian blood but, along with the Shawnee Indians, had been adopted 
into the Cherokee Nation as part of the same treaty with the U.S. Government 
that extended Cherokee citizenship to Freedmen.19 Intermarried whites and 
Cherokee Freedmen, however, lacked any Indian blood but were recorded as 
citizens of the Cherokee Nation nonetheless.20 Both the 1866 and 1975 versions 
of the Cherokee Constitution thus seemingly permitted Cherokee Freedmen 
and their descendants to be citizens of the Nation.21 However, in 1993, the 
Cherokee Nation enacted 11 C.N.C.A. § 12, which states: 
A. Tribal membership is derived only through proof of 
Cherokee blood based on the Final Rolls. 
B. The Registrar will issue tribal membership to a person 
who can prove that he or she is an original enrollee listed 
on the Final Rolls by blood or who can prove to at least one 
direct ancestor listed by blood on the Final Rolls.22  
Under 11 C.N.C.A. § 3, “Definitions,” the Act further clarified that such 
                                                 
 
17  CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 1 (amended 1975 version), available at 
http://www.cherokee.org/Our-Government/Commissions/Constitution-Convention/1975-Cherokee-
Nation-Constitution.  
18  Ray, supra note 13, at 391. 
19 Id. at 395. 
20  Id. at 391–92 n.15.  
21 See CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 5 (amended 1866 version); see also CONST. 
OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 1 (amended 1975 version). 
22  11 CHEROKEE NATION CODE ANNOTATED [C.N.C.A.] § 12 (1993), available at 
http://www.cherokee.org/Portals/AttorneyGeneral/Users/213/13/213/Word%20Searchable%20Full%2
0Code.pdf?ver=2015-10-22-083614-130.  
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membership could only be traced to the “Cherokees by Blood,” “Cherokee 
Minors by Blood,” “Delaware Cherokees,” and “Shawnee Cherokees” 
sections of the Dawes Final Rolls.23  
 The language of the legislation reflected a clear attempt to limit tribal 
membership to only those with some lineal Indian ancestry and 
corresponding amounts of Indian blood. This Act was challenged by Lucy 
Allen, a descendant of several individuals listed on the Dawes Commission 
Rolls as “Cherokee Freedmen.”24 Allen claimed that the legislation was in 
conflict with Article III of the 1975 Cherokee Nation Constitution and the 
earlier 1866 treaty with the U.S. Government that extended Cherokee 
citizenship to the Freedmen.25 Allen thus sought a declaration that the 
provision was unconstitutional and that she, like other Freedmen 
descendants, was entitled to Cherokee citizenship.26 In its 2006 decision, 
the Cherokee Nation’s highest court sided with Allen and ruled that 11 
C.N.C.A. § 12 was in conflict with Article III of the Cherokee Constitution 
and was thus unconstitutional.27 The court further ruled that the 1866 
treaty between the Cherokee Nation and the U.S. Government otherwise 
precluded the Cherokee Nation from foreclosing Cherokee citizenship to 
descendants of the Cherokee Freedmen, writing that: 
[I]f the Cherokee Nation is going to make a decision not to 
abide by a previous treaty provision, it must do so by clear 
actions which are consistent with the Cherokee Nation 
Constitution. A treaty provision cannot be set aside by 
mere implication. . . . If the Cherokee people want to 
change the legal definition of Cherokee citizenship, they 
must do so expressly.28  
Taking the Nation’s court up on its words, then-Principal Chief Chad 
Smith immediately called for a popular vote upon the definition of tribal 
citizenship “once and for all.”29 Chief Smith advocated for the exclusion of 
                                                 
 
23  Id. at § 3. 
24 Lucy Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribunal Council, JAT-04-09, at 1 (Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals 
Tribunal March 7, 2006), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/allen-v-cherokee-nation.pdf. 
25  See id. at 2.  
26 See id. at 1.  
27  Id. at 21.  
28  Id. at 20.  
29  See Ray, supra note 13, at 392.   
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the Freedmen descendants from the tribal rolls and succinctly described his 
position as a belief “that an Indian nation should be composed of Indians.”30 
Meanwhile, Marilyn Vann, President of the Descendants of Freedmen of the 
Five Civilized Tribes, launched a campaign against the measure. Vann 
emphasized the role of the Freedmen in the history of the Cherokee tribe31. 
She characterized the dispute in question form, asking: “Is the Cherokee 
Nation a ‘race’ or a ‘nation’?”32 By a March 2007 special election, 77% of 
voters sided with Chief Smith and against the Freedmen descendants in 
declaring “that an Indian nation should be composed of Indians.”33 The 
Cherokee Nation proceeded to decline the processing of any Cherokee 
Freedmen citizenship applications and later brought suit for a declaration 
that Cherokee Freedmen descendants are not entitled to tribal citizenship.34 
The named “Freedmen Defendants” then counterclaimed for a declaration 
that denial of their citizenship violates the U.S. and Cherokee constitutions, 
various federal laws, and the Treaty of 1866 between the Cherokee Nation 
and U.S. Government.35 The Nation’s position was subject to criticism in the 
media and the general public, and the fight of the Freedmen for recognition 
was the subject of a 2016 documentary film.36 After several years of 
litigation, a federal court ultimately sided with the Freedmen but largely 
refrained from offering any insight into the larger issues raised by the 
dispute.37 Rather, the court simply held that the Cherokee Nation was 
bound by the contractual language of its 1866 Treaty with the United 
States, which required that the Freedmen and their descendants be granted 
“all the rights of native Cherokees”—up to and including citizenship in the 
Nation.38   
 
 
                                                 
 
30  Id. 
31  Id., at pg. 397 n. 41.  
32  Id.  
33  Id. at 394.  
34  See Cherokee Nation v. Nash, No. 11-CV-648-TCK-TLW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35996 (N.D. Okla. 
March 15, 2013).  
35  See id. at *10–11.  
36  See, e.g., Nadine Ajaka, Descendants of Cherokee Freedmen Are Being Denied Tribal Rights, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2016). 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171022005336/https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/510728/descen
dants-of-cherokee-freedmen-are-being-denied-tribal-rights/.  
37  Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. August 30, 2017). 
38  Id.  
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B.  Races, Nations, and Indians 
The representative quotations from Chief Smith and Marilyn Vann 
in the Cherokee Freedmen dispute raise points of thought that transcend 
the citizenship of the Cherokee Freedmen. Chief Smith declared his belief 
“that an Indian nation should be composed of Indians,” and a majority of 
Cherokee voters endorsed this belief. Vann, meanwhile, questioned whether 
the Cherokee Nation was a “‘race’ or a ‘nation’?” and emphasized the role of 
the Freedmen in the Nation’s history. Defining “Indian” status—that is, 
deciding who is an Indian for legal purposes—and categorizing such status 
as a political or racial classification is central to federal criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian country, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Indian Health 
Service hiring preferences, and a bevy of legislation providing for special 
treatment of Indians, such as the Indian Child Welfare Act. However, legal 
treatment of “Indian” status in each of these contexts is less than uniform. 
There is support in the legal treatment of both Indian tribes and their 
Indian citizens for the idea that an Indian nation is at times a race, at times 
a nation, and at times a combination of the two. Similarly, the classification 
of individuals as “Indian” in different contexts seems to depend on shifting 
views of Indian tribes as races, nations, or hybrids. Seemingly, the only 
consistent theme in formulation of “Indian status” is convenience and 
necessity in reaching or upholding the policy preferences of individual 
judges and legislatures.  
The way in which society defines and classifies Indian status is of 
great importance. Government action that utilizes racial classifications—
even when seeking to “benefit” a given racial group through affirmative 
action—must withstand strict scrutiny analysis.39 Strict scrutiny is the 
highest standard of Equal Protection and Due Process review, and it 
requires that the government prove that its racial classifications “are 
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling government 
interests.”40 If Indian status is treated as a race-based distinction under 
current precedent, the government would carry a heavy burden in each 
instance that it utilizes Indian status as a legal classification. To the extent 
that Indian status is considered a political classification, however, the 
                                                 
 
39   See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
40   Id. at 227. 
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challenged law need only satisfy the more relaxed rational basis review. 
Indeed, under rational basis review, legislation bears a presumption of 
constitutionality, and courts are instructed to exercise “judicial restraint” in 
reviewing governmental action.41  
Section II of this Article will examine treatment of Indian status in 
the sphere of criminal law, and Section III will examine Indian status as it 
has been treated in the context of civil law. Section IV will discuss 
implications of the differing ways in which the law has treated Indian 
status, and suggest two alternative approaches. 
 
I. “INDIAN”  STATUS IN CRIMINAL LAW  
A.  Federal Jurisdiction, the Two-Prong Rogers  Test, and 
United States v. Antelope  
In Ex parte Crow Dog, a Sioux Indian named Crow Dog sought a writ 
of habeas corpus after being imprisoned by a federal marshal for the murder 
of another Sioux Indian, Spotted Tail, in Indian country.42 The Supreme 
Court granted Crow Dog’s writ and held that, unless expressly authorized 
by Congress, federal courts have no jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
Indians, against Indians, in Indian country.43 In response to the Court’s 
decision, Congress passed the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and 
the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.44 The General Crimes Act extends 
federal law and federal jurisdiction to offenses committed in Indian country 
by Indians against non-Indians and vice versa.45 Meanwhile, the Major 
Crimes Act extends federal jurisdiction to certain Indian-on-Indian offenses 
                                                 
 
41   See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–314 (1993) (describing rational basis 
review as “a paradigm of judicial restraint”).  
42  109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883). 
43  Id. at 571–72. (holding that it was inappropriate to extend the law of United States over Indians—
“aliens and strangers”—for: “[i]t tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, 
nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social state of 
which they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to 
the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the 
red man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.”). 
44  Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, To Be or Not to Be: Who is an “Indian Person”?, 73 MONT. L. REV. 
61, 62–63 (2012).  
45  Id. at 62.  
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in Indian country, including murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, arson, 
burglary, and robbery.46 The Major Crimes Act was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in United States. v. Kagama.47 As an early formulation of Congress’s 
plenary power over the affairs of the Indian tribes, the Kagama Court held 
that Congress necessarily has a virtually unchecked power to enact 
legislation that governs the Indian tribes as a result of the tribes’ statuses 
as “wards of the nation” and “communities dependent on the United 
States.”48    
Neither the General Crimes Act nor the Major Crimes Act provides a 
definition of who is an “Indian,” but status as an “Indian” is central to 
federal criminal jurisdiction in each act. For instance, when the government 
prosecutes an individual under the Major Crimes Act, they must allege in 
the indictment and prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the 
defendant is indeed an “Indian.”49 Indian status has become in some cases 
a tangled issue of fact. When framed in the context of the Cherokee 
Freedmen controversy, legal treatment of Indian status in the criminal law 
arena can perhaps be generalized as embracing Chief Smith’s declaration 
that “an Indian nation should be composed of Indians,” while reserving that 
Indian blood, alone, does not make one an Indian.  
One of the early treatments of status as an Indian is found in the 
peculiar case of United States v. Rogers.50 Therein, the Supreme Court was 
presented with a defendant who challenged his indictment under the laws 
of the United States, because he had: 
voluntarily removed to the Cherokee country, and made it 
his home, without any intention of returning to the United 
States, that he incorporated himself with the said tribe of 
Indians as one of them, and was so treated, recognized, and 
adopted by the said tribe, and the proper authorities 
thereof, and exercised all the rights and privileges of a 
Cherokee Indian in the said tribe, and was domiciled in 
their country; that by these acts he became a citizen of the 
                                                 
 
46  18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
47  118 U.S. 375 (1886).  
48  Id. at 383–84.  
49  Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 42, at 63. See also United States v. LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 877 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  
50  United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846).  
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Cherokee nation, and was, and still is, a Cherokee Indian, 
within the true intent and meaning of the act of Congress 
in that behalf made and provided.51    
The Court rejected the man’s plea because “[w]hatever 
obligations the prisoner may have taken upon himself by 
becoming a Cherokee by adoption . . . he was still a white man, 
of the white race, and therefore not within the exception in the 
act of Congress.”52  
The dated Rogers decision stands for the idea that Indian status has 
both a racial and a political prong. And courts continue to rely on and apply 
Rogers for purposes of proving Indian status in a criminal prosecution by 
“ask[ing] whether the defendant (1) has some Indian blood, and (2) is 
recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government.”53  
Federal jurisdiction in Indian Country, combined with the two-prong 
Rogers test, means that certain criminal defendants deemed “Indians” will 
be subjected to federal laws, prosecution, and penalties on the basis of their 
Indian status, whereas similarly situated non-Indians would otherwise be 
subject to state criminal law. In United States v. Antelope, a group of 
criminal defendants belonging to the Coeur d’Alene tribe brought a Fifth 
Amendment challenge to this scheme.54 The Indian defendants committed 
a robbery and burglary in Idaho but were also charged with and convicted 
of first-degree murder under federal felony murder provisions, as the elderly 
homeowner died during the robbery. The defendants were subject to federal 
jurisdiction and federal law by way of their Indian status and the Major 
Crimes Act. However, Idaho state law lacked an analogous felony murder 
provision.55 Thus, in a prosecution involving a similarly-situated non-
Indian, the prosecution would have had to prove premeditation and 
deliberation to support a first-degree murder charge under Idaho state 
law.56 But by no reason other than their Indian status, the defendants in 
this case were subject to a federal felony murder provision that allowed 
them to be convicted of first-degree murder in the absence of premeditation 
                                                 
 
51  Id. at 571.  
52  Id. at 573.  
53  See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009).  
54  United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).  
55  Id., at 643-44.  
56  Id., at 644.  
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or deliberation—the federal prosecution need only show that a death 
occurred during the commission of their crime.57 On this basis, the 
defendants challenged the Major Crimes Act as unconstitutional and 
violative of due process, reasoning that they were subject to a stricter 
federal statutory scheme on the basis of an impermissible racial 
classification—that is, their status as “Indian.” The Ninth Circuit was 
inclined to agree, holding that the difference between Idaho and federal law 
“put [the defendants] at a serious racially-based disadvantage.”58 However, 
the Supreme Court reversed and rejected the defendants’ challenge. The 
Court first reasoned that “federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based 
upon impermissible [racial] classifications,” but rather “is rooted in the 
unique status of Indians as a ‘separate people’ with their own political 
institutions.”59 By this understanding, the defendants “were not subjected 
to federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but 
because they are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene tribe.”60 The Court 
then concluded that, because the federal statutory scheme was applied 
evenhandedly and equally to all those subject to it—Indian or non-Indian—
the defendants’ challenge was invalid.61 
B.  Uneven Approaches To Indian Status  
Given the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning in Antelope, one 
might expect for courts to treat the racial prong of Rogers as a cursory 
exercise or abandon it all together. And one might also expect that the 
political prong requires that a criminal defendant be an “enrolled member 
of . . . [a] tribe.”62 Neither has held true, however, and courts have taken 
inconsistent approaches and reached inconsistent results under the two-
prong Rogers test.  
Case law indicates that tribal enrollment is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for Indian status.63 The Ninth Circuit, for example, holds that the 
                                                 
 
57  Id. at 644.  
58  United States v. Antelope, 523 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1975).  
59  Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646. 
60  Id.  
61  Id. at 648–49.  
62  Id. at 646. 
63  See United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that tribal 
enrollment is not “an absolute requirement . . . [n]or should it be”).  
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political prong can be established “in declining order of importance,” by 
evidence of: “(1) tribal enrollment; (2) government recognition formally and 
informally through receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; (3) 
enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and (4) social recognition as 
an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian 
social life.”64 
The Eighth Circuit adopted this same framework in United States v. 
Stymiest.65 There, it upheld a set of jury instructions that provided relevant 
factors in determining whether the second prong of Rogers—recognition as 
an Indian—is met, including:  
[E]nrollment in a tribe . . . government recognition formally 
or informally through providing the defendant assistance 
reserved only to Indians . . . tribal recognition formally or 
informally through subjecting the defendant to tribal court 
jurisdiction . . . enjoying the benefits of tribal affiliation; 
and . . . social recognition as an Indian through living on a 
reservation and participating in Indian social life, including 
whether the defendant holds himself out as an Indian.66 
The court further noted that “there is no single correct way to instruct 
a jury on this issue.” 67 In other words, there is no definite set of factors that 
conclusively make a defendant an Indian or non-Indian. 
The Eighth Circuit has accordingly adopted a loose approach to Indian 
status. In United States v. Dodge, it held that defendants who presented 
themselves socially as Indians and possessed Indian blood were “Indians” 
for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, independent of tribal affiliation.68 
And in United States v. Pemberton, it upheld the Indian status of a criminal 
defendant who was not enrolled in any federally-recognized tribe.69 The 
court relied on evidence that the defendant’s mother was an enrolled tribal 
member, he was born and attended school on the tribal reservation, he 
presented as an Indian in social contexts, and he had a daughter who lived 
                                                 
 
64  United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).  
65  581 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 2009).  
66  Id. at 763 (emphasis added).  
67  Id. at 764.  
68  538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976).  
69  405 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2005).  
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with her mother on the reservation.70     
In United States v. Cruz, the Ninth Circuit, however, took a relatively 
stricter approach to Indian status and concluded that Indian blood, without 
conclusive tribal recognition of a defendant as an Indian, does not make one 
an “Indian.”71 The defendant, Cruz, had 22% Blackfeet and 25% total Indian 
blood and was the son of an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe. Though 
not enrolled in the Blackfeet Tribe himself, Cruz held “descendant” status, 
which entitled him to use of Indian Health Services, certain educational 
grants, and fishing and hunting rights on the tribal reservation. Cruz also 
lived on the Reservation as a child, was subject to the jurisdiction of the 
tribal court as an “Indian” in prosecution for an offense, attended school, 
and worked on the tribal reservation.72 However, because Cruz was not an 
officially enrolled member of the tribe and had otherwise not taken 
advantage of “descendant” status privileges, participated in cultural 
ceremonies, voted in tribal elections, or held a tribal identification card, the 
court held that Cruz had not been proven to be an Indian for purposes of a 
prosecution under the Major Crimes Act.73 The court otherwise noted the 
importance of demonstrating a “sufficient non-racial link to a formerly 
sovereign people,” lest Indian status be transformed into a “simple blood 
test.”74  
   Even if the Indian status inquiry involves more than a “simple blood 
test,” the maintenance of the Rogers racial prong means that all cases 
necessarily rise, and some fall, on the basis of such a test. The Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Diaz accordingly stands for the idea 
that tribal recognition and affiliation, without the racial aspect of Indian 
blood, is an insufficient basis for Indian status.75 In Diaz, the Indian 
defendant argued that the government had failed to prove the non-Indian 
status of the victim, and thus federal jurisdiction under the General Crimes 
Act—which applies to Indian-on-non-Indian (and vice versa) crimes in 
Indian country—was lacking. The court overruled Diaz’s objection and 
found evidence that the victim was descended from “Sephardic” or “Hispanic 
                                                 
 
70  Id. at 658–61.  
71  554 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009).  
72  Id. at 846–47.  
73  Id. 
74  Id. at 849 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
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Jews,” and lacked any Indian ancestry. This apparent absence of Indian 
descent was sufficient to demonstrate non-Indian status, even though the 
victim was an enrolled member of an Indian pueblo, with active tribal 
affiliation.76 The decision in Diaz relied on an earlier Tenth Circuit decision, 
United States v. Prentiss, wherein the court held that stipulation and 
testimony that two victims were members of the Tesuque Pueblo did not 
meet the standard for proving their Indian status, as it “[did] not establish 
that either of them had any Indian blood.”77 Moreover, courts treat the 
racial prong as wholly independent of the political prong—requiring only 
“proof of some quantum of Indian blood, whether or not that blood derives 
from” an ancestor who was a member of any federally-recognized tribe, let 
alone the tribe upon which the political prong has been satisfied.78 These 
results seemingly undercut the basis for the decision in United States v. 
Antelope—that federal jurisdiction results from political affiliation with a 
tribe, as opposed to the defendant’s racial status and Indian heritage.79  
The two-prong test of United States v. Rogers nonetheless remains, 
by all judicial accounts, good law in establishing the Indian status of a 
defendant. However, one must wonder why official tribal recognition and 
affiliation, as in the cases of Diaz and Prentiss, or Indian blood combined 
with significant tribal ties that apparently fall just short of official 
recognition, as in Cruz, are not independently sufficient demonstrations of 
Indian status. The reality is that both the political and racial formulations 
of Indian status are necessary to fulfill the prerogatives of federal 
jurisdiction over Indian defendants. The Rogers test persists out of 
convenience and necessity.  
The racial prong of the Rogers test—Indian blood—provides a 
convenient litmus test from which to begin proof of Indian status. It is also 
convenient—or, perhaps, necessary—in fulfilling Congress’s intent in 
asserting jurisdiction over certain crimes and certain defendants in Indian 
country. This is apparent from the very outset of the test in United States 
v. Rogers itself. The Supreme Court there noted the necessity of certain 
forms of federal jurisdiction in Indian country, as prescribed by Congress, 
in order to maintain peace and order in and among the Indian tribes. In 
                                                 
 
76  Id. at 1187–88.  
77  273 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2001).  
78  United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015). Note, however, that the political 
prong requires that the defendant be affiliated with a tribe that enjoys current federal recognition 
(as opposed to terminated tribes, tribe with mere state recognition, or loose historical status as a 
tribe). See id.; LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304–06 (9th Cir. 1993).  
79  430 U.S. at 646. 
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rationalizing the necessity of the racial prong of Indian status, the Court 
reasoned that: 
[I]t would perhaps be found difficult to preserve peace 
among [the tribes], if white men of every description might 
at pleasure settle among them, and, by procuring an 
adoption by one of the tribes, throw off all responsibility to 
the laws of the United States, and claim to be treated by 
the government and its officers as if they were Indians 
born. It can hardly be supposed that Congress intended to 
grant such exemptions, especially to men of that class who 
are most likely to become Indians by adoption, and who will 
generally be found the most mischievous and dangerous 
inhabitants of the Indian country.80 
 
Fears of tribally-adopted White outlaws, “the most mischievous and 
dangerous inhabitants of the Indian country,” evading federal law are 
unfounded in modern times. However, the racial prong of the Rogers test 
still serves the congressional intent of the modern General Crimes Act. A 
racial non-Indian who commits a non-Major Crimes Act offense against an 
Indian in Indian country, for instance, cannot avoid federal jurisdiction 
under the General Crimes Act by claiming to have been adopted, recognized 
by, or otherwise affiliated with an Indian tribe. The critic might note that 
Rogers is outdated, in the sense that recordkeeping is much more 
standardized and rigorous now than in our earlier history. But given the 
loose approach to political affiliation that courts have adopted, one could see 
the non-Indian spouse or longtime resident of Indian Country claiming to 
be so involved in tribal society and culture as to have acquired legal “Indian” 
status. The racial prong of Rogers preemptively forecloses any such inquiry.   
    The political prong of the Rogers test—tribal or governmental 
recognition as an Indian—is also necessary to fulfill congressional intent. 
Indeed, without including the political prong of the Rogers test, Indian 
status for the purpose of federal jurisdiction would violate due process and 
equal protection rights as a pure racial classification or “simple [racial] 
blood test.”81 The political prong serves as a fallback provision that 
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preserves the Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act against 
constitutional challenges. The Supreme Court’s decision in Antelope is 
instructive on this point.82   
   Taken together and as applied by subsequent courts, the racial and 
political prongs of the Rogers test serve a further practical convenience. As 
United States v. Cruz demonstrates, proving Indian status in a prosecution 
can be a fact-intensive, uncertain endeavor. However, once the government 
has offered objective evidence that a defendant satisfies the racial prong—
that is, has Indian blood—and the political prong—that is, recognition as an 
Indian by a tribe or government—they have met their burden. A defendant 
cannot then turn their prosecution into a mini-trial on their subjective self-
identification that otherwise negates federal jurisdiction. Such was the 
underlying basis for the result in United States v. Juvenile Male.83 There, a 
juvenile defendant appealed his conviction under the Major Crimes Act to 
the Ninth Circuit. The juvenile admitted to having Indian blood. The 
juvenile also admitted that he was an enrolled tribal member, lived on a 
tribal reservation, received tribal assistance, and otherwise enjoyed the 
benefits of tribal affiliation.84 The juvenile contended, though, that he did 
not see himself as “Indian” and was not socially recognized as such.85 The 
court overruled these arguments and held that although “[s]ocial and 
subjective non-recognition as Indian may prove to be relevant in a closer 
case,” it could not outweigh the substantial proof in favor of each Rogers 
prong as applied in Ninth Circuit precedent.86  
   The racial and political prongs make sense when viewed as providing 
flexibility and legality to the Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act. 
When viewed in the context of individual cases however, it becomes difficult 
to identify consistency and logical coherency. For instance, use of Indian 
status for purposes of the federal criminal jurisdiction scheme was upheld 
in Antelope as involving a political classification rather than a racial one.  
However, in applying this scheme and Indian status in United States v. 
Pemberton, the Eighth Circuit held that a defendant with Indian blood—
even though not an enrolled member of any federally-recognized tribe—was 
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an Indian for purposes of federal jurisdiction because testimony showed that 
he had presented himself as an Indian in social contexts.87 This focus on 
blood, ancestry, and self-identification—despite lack of tribal government 
recognition—sounds of pure racial classification as compared to a political 
classification. Similarly, in Martin v. United States, a federal court refused 
the defendant’s challenge to his Indian status, even though he was not 
enrolled in a tribe and apparently did not meet the necessary blood quantum 
requirements for such enrollment in the Red Lake Band of Chippewa 
Indians.88 And the Tenth Circuit’s decisions in Prentiss and Diaz are based 
on the idea that, even where official political recognition exists, Indian 
status hinges on race and heritage.89 Such decisions might make sense from 
a realist perspective—that is, in accomplishing policy goals and tabbing an 
Indian as an Indian—but they undercut the very logic of the precedential 
foundation from which they extend. The decisions in this arena are hard to 
square with one another and often consist of questionable factual 
distinctions and resulting conclusions. Compare, for instance, the 
Pemberton decision and the Cruz dissent against the Cruz majority opinion 
that treated a defendant who had 22% Blackfeet and 25% total Indian blood, 
attended a reservation school, was prosecuted as an Indian in tribal court, 
and committed his crime on the tribal reservation, as a non-Indian.90 
 
II. “INDIAN”  STATUS IN CIVIL LAW  
A.  Upholding Differential Treatments: Mancari  and its Progeny 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (Wheeler-Howard Act) 
represented a progressive-era paradigm shift in U.S. policy towards Indians 
and tribes, emphasizing Indian self-government and tribal sovereignty.91 
                                                 
 
87  United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 662 (8th Cir. 2005).  
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One statutory provision that was introduced as part of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 
5116 (formerly 25 U.S.C. § 472), codifies a preference for employment of 
Indians over non-Indians in the BIA. The statute provides, simply, that the 
Secretary of the Interior: is directed to establish standards . . . without 
regard to civil-service laws, to the various positions maintained . . . by the 
Indian Office, in the administration of functions or services affecting any 
Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to 
appointment to vacancies in any such positions.92 Thus, the Indian Health 
Service website states that: 
 
The Indian Health Service is required by law to provide 
absolute preference in employment to American Indians 
and Alaska Natives who are enrolled in a federally 
recognized tribe as defined by the Secretary of the Interior. 
Indian preference requirements apply to all actions involved 
in filling a vacant position (e.g., initial hiring, 
reassignment, transfer, competitive promotion, 
reappointment or reinstatement), no matter how the 
vacancy arises.93 
 
Similarly, the BIA provides that: 
 
Indian Preference affords absolute hiring preference to 
qualified Indian individuals . . . . Indian Preference applies 
to the initial hiring, reassignment, transfer, competitive 
promotion, reappointment, reinstatement, or any personnel 
action intended to fill a vacant position. 
When one or more qualified Indian Preference applicants 
apply for an advertised vacancy, non-Indian applicants will 
not be initially rated nor referred to the selecting official for 
                                                 
 
and “attempted to revitalize tribal self-government by providing for formal adoption of tribal 
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92  25 U.S.C. § 5116 (Supp. IV 2013–2017). 
93   INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, https://www.ihs.gov/careeropps/indianpreference/ (last visited Aug. 22, 
2018) (emphasis added). 
 
 
2019]                           Legal Treatments of Indian Status                           66 
 
   
consideration.94  
 
Indian preference not only gives absolute preference to Indians over non-
Indians, but also supersedes any other federal government hiring 
preferences, such as those reserved for military veterans.95  
The Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to such Indian 
employment preferences in Morton v. Mancari.96 There, a group of non-
Indian federal employees challenged the preference as violative of the Due 
Process Clause, and otherwise impliedly repealed by the 1972 Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act. In a questionable analysis, the Court jumped 
from noting the plenary power of Congress in dealing with Indian tribes, to 
the “special relationship” between the federal government and Indian 
tribes, to its holding that: 
[T]his preference does not constitute “racial 
discrimination.” Indeed, it is not even a “racial” preference. 
Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed 
to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make 
the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent 
groups. . . . The preference, as applied, is granted to 
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as 
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and 
activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.97 
Arguably, though, responsiveness to the needs of such constituent 
groups and an understanding of the BIA’s role in governing tribal entities 
could serve as the basis for evaluating, hiring, and promoting employees, 
without regard to Indian or non-Indian status. The Court further noted that 
“[t]he preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of 
‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. 
This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified 
as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in 
                                                 
 
94   BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, The Indian Preference Law Fact Sheet,  
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/webteam/pdf/idc1-025252.pdf (emphasis added).  
95  See id. 
96  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 535 (1974).  
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nature.”98 
To determine the scope of Mancari, it is important to look at how the 
Court reached its result. In emphasizing “the unique legal status of Indian 
tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress,” the Court 
drew “both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself.”99 “Article 
I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . 
with the Indian Tribes,’ and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a 
proper subject for separate legislation.”100 Meanwhile, “Article II, § 2, cl. 2, 
gives the President the power, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to make treaties.”101 The Court thus recognized that, acting under 
these two constitutional clauses, Congress and the Executive had 
established a “historical and legal context” for “singl[ing] out Indians for 
particular and special treatment.”102  
     The Supreme Court has applied Morton v. Mancari in a number of 
cases. In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, the Court noted 
that although “[t]he power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a 
plenary nature . . . it is not absolute.”103 Relying on Mancari, it stated that 
the appropriate standard of review is that “legislative judgment[s] should 
not be disturbed ‘[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to 
the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.’”104 In 
United States. v. Antelope, discussed above, the Court stated that Mancari 
extends to federal legislation involving both “preferences [and] disabilities,” 
and to Congress’ broader power of “federal regulation” over Indian affairs, 
as opposed to a narrower power to promote “tribal self-regulation” through 
supportive legislation.105  
     The Supreme Court was soon faced with the question as to whether 
Mancari extends to differential treatments of Indians under state law. In 
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, it 
first noted Mancari had “settled that ‘the unique legal status of Indian 
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tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact 
legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be 
constitutionally offensive.”106 It then recognized that “[s]tates do not enjoy 
this same unique relationship with Indians.”107 But it found that the 
legislation at hand was “not simply another state law,” but rather one 
“enacted in response to a federal measure explicitly designed to readjust the 
allocation of jurisdiction over Indians.”108 It thus upheld a scheme of limited 
state jurisdiction over Indian Country pursuant to Congress’ authorization 
through Public Law 280. In its conclusion, the Court suggested that, in the 
arena of Indian affairs, states may “[legislate] under explicit authority 
granted by Congress” without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, 
provided that Congress has properly “exercise[d] . . . federal power” in its 
authorization.109  
B.  Inconsistent Treatments of Mancari  in the Lower Courts 
The racial-political distinction in Morton v. Mancari has since been 
applied to uphold preferences and special treatment of Indians in various 
arenas against Due Process and Equal Protection challenges. The 
distinction serves as a continuing basis for upholding Indian status 
determinations for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction (since United 
States v. Antelope, discussed above), even though a number of cases have 
allowed for federal jurisdiction over defendants with Indian blood, but no 
tribal enrollment or significant tribal affiliation.110 It was the basis for 
rejecting the State of Montana’s claim that a sales tax immunity for Indians, 
not available to non-Indians under parallel circumstances, violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses.111 It was also used in rejecting a 
North Carolina criminal defendant’s Equal Protection argument, where he 
was charged and convicted of conducting a video gambling operation that 
                                                 
 
106   Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500–01 
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109  Id. 
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(1976).  
 
 
69          Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality                  [7:1 
 
 
was identical to legal gambling enterprises conducted by Indians in the 
state.112 Mancari was also featured in an interesting Fifth Circuit decision 
on the subject of peyote use, Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. 
Thornburgh.113 There, the court upheld the enforcement of federal and state 
drug laws against a peyote church that mirrored the beliefs of the Native 
American Church, used peyote as a sacrament in bona fide religious 
ceremony, maintained detailed records, and sincerely regarded peyote as 
appropriate for religious, and only religious, ceremony.114 This holding was 
made despite the fact that the Native American Church was the only church 
expressly exempted from the same peyote laws, and it only afforded 
membership to those with a specified Indian blood quantum, without regard 
to tribal membership. Because of Mancari, the court was able essentially to 
sidestep the issue of sincerity of religious beliefs and Equal Protection.115 In 
short, Mancari is central to a number of legal decisions that uphold the 
differential treatment of Indian and non-Indian individuals in a variety of 
contexts and for a variety of purposes.  
It follows, both naturally from Mancari and more specifically from 
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, that 
rational basis review extends to state-law classifications existing because of 
and pursuant to congressional authorization—states can be useful partners 
(or agents) in carrying out federal prerogatives. Perhaps the best example 
of this is the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which affords 
states some role in the regulation of gaming and gambling in Indian 
Country, and establishes a framework for states and tribes to enter into 
cooperative compacts by which tribes conduct Class III gaming in Indian 
Country.116 Accordingly, courts have rejected challenges to these underlying 
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state-tribal compacts from non-Indians as violative of Equal Protection by 
relying on Mancari.117 
Lower courts remain split, however, as to the circumstances in which 
Mancari insulates differential state-law treatments of Indians and non-
Indians beyond those explicitly authorized by federal legislation. Courts 
have also struggled with classifications that advance the general interests 
of individual Indians as opposed to tribal interests within the scope of the 
unique federal-tribal relationship.  
As with the case law on Indian status for purposes of federal criminal 
jurisdiction, the treatment of Indian status classification in these 
circumstances is difficult to rectify with any consistent theme. For instance, 
in Livingston v. Ewing, the Tenth Circuit upheld the application of Mancari 
in the context of Indian artists and craftsmen selling wares at the Museum 
of New Mexico and Palace of the Governors in Santa Fe.118 There, non-
Indians brought an Equal Protection claim against a state program 
extending preference to Indian artists, and to the complete exclusion of 
similarly situated non-Indians, who were allowed the special, sole right to 
sell crafts and jewelry on the state-owned grounds.119 The court held that 
this was not racial discrimination per Mancari and rejected an attempt to 
differentiate Mancari as applying only to employment practices.120 The 
result reached by the Tenth Circuit in Livingston is remarkable in that it 
extended Mancari—which was based on the unique political relationship 
between the federal government and Indian tribes—to state-law 
classifications that were not explicitly authorized by federal legislation from 
Congress and that lacked any substantial connection to tribal interests in 
self-government.121 Meanwhile, the federal court in Tafoya v. Albuquerque 
held that an Indian preference ordinance, which extended vending licenses 
only to members of federally recognized tribes or pueblos in New Mexico and 
members of the Navajo Nation, was founded on a suspect-racial 
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classification and thus subject to strict scrutiny—under which it failed and 
was struck down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.122 And the 
Tenth Circuit in Navajo Nation v. New Mexico struck down the State of New 
Mexico’s decision to cut funding from a program providing home care to 
members of the Navajo Nation in order to cover a budget shortfall for more 
general state programs.123 Although it avoided the district court’s clear 
treatment of the Navajo Nation as a racial group, the Tenth Circuit 
nonetheless framed the state action within the context of impermissible, 
race-based discrimination. No mention of Morton v. Mancari or its general 
principle was made. Indeed, the court concluded that: 
When a state begins with a system in which funds are being distributed 
equitably among various racial groups, and then cuts one group’s funding 
discriminatorily without showing that that group’s need has lessened, the 
undeniable result is a disparity in the adequacy of services provided among 
the groups. . . . [T]he state may not continue its disparately low funding 
based on the unconstitutional cut.124  
Further, the court referred to the Navajo Nation as a “race or nationality-
based organization,” and members of the Navajo Nation as a “racially 
identifiable population.”125 
    Uneven logic and results are not confined to the federal courts of the 
Tenth Circuit. The federal court for the District of Minnesota, citing to 
Livingston v. Ewing, upheld a state housing program that offered special 
funding to individual Indians in urban (off-reservation) settings.126 The 
court interpreted the federal-tribal trust doctrine as applying on an equal 
basis to state action, and concluded that the Minnesota legislature was “not 
barred by the equal protection clause or civil rights statutes” from providing 
special funding and programs for individual Indians to the exclusion of non-
Indians.127 Relying on this federal case, a Minnesota appellate court upheld 
the preferential treatment of Indian teachers with less seniority than non-
Indian teachers.128 During a budget shortfall, a number of non-Indian 
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teachers were fired or placed on unpaid leave while Indian teachers retained 
their position.129 The court held that the “trust doctrine also applies to state 
action,” so the preferential treatment of Indian teachers did not violate 
equal protection for the non-Indian teachers—it was deemed “rationally 
related” to interests in increasing the number of Indian teachers and 
responding to cultural and academic needs of Indian students.130  
Meanwhile, a Florida appellate court reached an opposite result in a 
situation much more analogous to Mancari.131 Faced with an Indian 
employment preference, the court held “that Indian preference is legal 
under Federal law is irrelevant; what is legal under Federal law is not the 
same as what is legal under Florida law.”132 The court’s logic rested on the 
idea that the federal-tribal trust doctrine did not translate to the state of 
Florida, and the Florida preference did not otherwise touch on any unique 
aspect of the federal-tribal relationship—even though the preference 
promoted Indian employment on a state council for Indian affairs.133 
The inconsistent application of Morton v. Mancari and differing treatment 
of the racial/political distinction by lower federal courts was acknowledged 
by the federal district court in KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick.134 
There, the court reluctantly applied rational-basis scrutiny to a state Indian 
preference law. The decision made various statements critical of Morton v. 
Mancari, including that:  
The government's power to regulate Indian affairs, which 
implicates weighty constitutional issues, should not rise or 
fall on a facile distinction. "Federally recognized Indian 
tribes" are quasi-sovereign political entities, to be sure, 
which is why some courts characterize the classification as 
political. Their members, however, share more than a like-
minded spirit of civic participation; they share the same 
                                                 
 
129  Id., at 836-37.  
130  Id. Had the policy been examined under strict scrutiny, it hardly could have been deemed narrowly 
tailored to the asserted interests. Nor is it clear that increasing the representation of a single racial 
group in a given occupation is a “compelling” governmental interest, particularly when it overrides 
the accrued seniority and tenure of non-Indians.  
131 Tuveson v. Fla. Governor’s Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 495 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
132  Id. at 793-94.   
133  See id. 
134  839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403 (D. Mass. 2012).  
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racial heritage. . . . Mancari ignores this crucial fact and 
proceeds from the irrational assumption that race is 
"nothing more than a politically meaningless classification 
based on ancestry" and that "tribal membership is purely 
a matter of voluntary civic participation.”135 
The court also stated that, if “addressing the issue as one of first impression, 
it would treat Indian tribal status as a quasi-political, quasi-racial 
classification subject to varying levels of scrutiny depending on the 
authority making it and the interests at stake.”136 However, it found itself 
bound to honor Mancari, based on its interpretation of language from 
certain Supreme Court holdings. On appeal, however, the First Circuit 
reversed this ruling, and held that:  
[I]t is quite doubtful that Mancari’s language can be 
extended to apply to preferential state classifications based 
on tribal status. Mancari itself relied on several sources of 
federal authority to reach its holding, including the portion 
of the Commerce Clause relating to Indian tribes, the treaty 
power, and the special trust relationship between Indian 
tribes and the federal government. The states have no 
equivalent authority.137 
 
The First Circuit then relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rice v. 
Cateyano—in which the Court declined to extend its holding Mancari to 
Native Hawaiians, despite a similar special trust relationship—and 
indicated that a state Indian preference statute is subject to strict scrutiny, 
because “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race.”138 
                                                 
 
135  Id. at 403–04.  
136  Id. at 404.  
137  KG Urban Enters.v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2012). The First Circuit referenced the 
Supreme Court’s application of strict scrutiny to a Native Hawaiian preference in Rice v. Cateyano, 
where the Supreme Court limited its holding in Mancari to Indian tribes—despite various 
similarities between U.S.-Indian and U.S.-Hawaiian relations, including a similar trust doctrine—
applied strict scrutiny, and struck down the preference, noting that “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for 
race.” 528 U.S. 495 (2000). The First Circuit thus remanded the case, and said that summary 
judgment disposition of the Equal Protection claim was actually premature, and essentially 
sanctioned lower courts in differentiating Morton v. Mancari as only applying to federal laws, not 
state laws. 
138 Id. at 19–20 (quoting Rice v. Cateyano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000)). 
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In Malabed v. North Slope Borough, three courts combined to speak 
on Mancari’s application to state-law preferences.139 The case involved a 
political subdivision of Alaska, North Slope Borough. Six of the seven 
members of the Borough’s council, along with its mayor, were Inupiat 
Eskimos. Armed with a favorable opinion letter from the federal EEOC, the 
mayor introduced and the Borough adopted a strong Indian employment 
preference code for all Borough hiring. The plaintiff in the case brought suit 
after he was hired but had his position abruptly terminated, then reopened 
and filled by an Indian candidate.140 The federal district court held that the 
employment preference was subject to strict scrutiny and violated equal 
protection principles. It stated that the Borough had “no constitutional 
mandate” nor “constitutional authority to enact remedial ordinances 
designed to cure general societal discrimination.”141 And it rejected any 
attempt to apply Mancari to the case at hand. The court noted that states 
do not have the same trust relationship toward Indians as the federal 
government, and otherwise explained that an employment preference with 
the Borough did not protect any unique tribal or cultural interests.142 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Alaska Supreme Court: 
whether the employment preference violated any provision of Alaska 
statutory or constitutional law.143 The Alaska Supreme Court also refused 
to apply Mancari and rejected the “notion that the Alaska Constitution 
radiates implied guardianship powers allowing the state or its boroughs to 
treat Alaska Native as if they were wards.”144 The court further noted that 
the “federal government’s . . . powers . . . spring directly from the express 
powers granted to Congress in the United States Constitution’s Indian 
Commerce and Treaty clauses.”145 There is no such authority to “implicitly 
grant parallel powers to state and municipal governments” in the regulation 
of Indian affairs.146 On this basis, the court concluded that the Borough 
                                                 
 
139 Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 42 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D. Alaska 1999). 
140 Id. at 929.  
141 Id. at 939.  
142 Id. at 937–39.  
143 Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 418 (Alaska 2003); Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 
335 F.3d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2003). 
144  Malabed, 70 P.3d at 422 (Alaska 2003). 
145  Id.  
146  Id. 
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lacked any “legitimate interest in enacting the disputed preference.”147 
Having received the court’s response, the Ninth Circuit rested its decision 
on the conclusion that the employment preference violated the Alaska 
guarantee of equal protection.148 But the Ninth Circuit made the point, in a 
footnote, that “Mancari held only that when Congress acts to fulfill its 
unique trust responsibilities toward Indian tribes, such legislation is not 
based on suspect classification”; extending the racial-political classification 
beyond this context of the federal-tribal relationship “puts more weight on 
Mancari than it can bear.”149 
   Morton v. Mancari, and its general holding—that Indian status is a 
political classification tied to the sovereign Indian tribes, not a racial one—
remains foundational to modern Indian legislation and case law. However, 
just as with the criminal cases discussed in the above section, a number of 
lower courts have made factual and legal distinctions in deciding whether 
Indian status is a racial or political classification. Thus, the issue of when 
lower and state courts—and individual judges—will apply Morton v. 
Mancari to state and local classifications based on Indian status remains 
unresolved. In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling that 
modifies or clarifies the scope of Mancari, this unsettled status is necessary 
in affording judges some level of flexibility. Of course what the “right” or 
“wrong” use of this discretion and flexibility may be is highly subjective and 
depends on individual preferences. But requiring that Morton v. Mancari be 
applied liberally, to all state and local laws, ordinances, regulations, and 
rules of any subject matter, and to all manner of government action, would 
raise serious questions in fringe cases. This also applies to some federal 
legislation, because even Congress’ “plenary power” must be moored to the 
federal-tribal relationship. The Ninth Circuit recognized as much in 
Williams v. Babbitt.150 The case involved an agency’s interpretive rule on 
the federal Reindeer Act of 1937. The interpretive rule would have effected 
a virtual monopoly on reindeer purchases and sales for Indians, and 
prohibited any non-Indian entry into the reindeer industry. The court 
ultimately struck down the agency interpretation as an unreasonably broad 
                                                 
 
147  Id. at 422–23.  
148  Malabed, 335 F.3d at 874 (9th Cir. 2003).  
149  Id. at 868 n.5.  
150  Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).  
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reading of the Reindeer Act. Along the way, the court surveyed Mancari and 
its progeny, and stated that “[w]hile Mancari is not necessarily limited to 
statutes that give special treatment to Indians on Indian land, we do read 
it as shielding only those statutes that affect uniquely Indian interests.”151 
The court continued: 
For example, we seriously doubt that Congress could give 
Indians a complete monopoly on the casino industry or on 
Space Shuttle contracts. At oral argument, counsel for the 
government conceded that granting natives a monopoly on 
all Space Shuttle contracts would not pass Mancari's 
rational-relation test. Counsel could only distinguish the 
Space Shuttle preference from a reindeer preference by 
noting that, in 1937, natives were heavily involved in the 
reindeer business whereas they aren't involved in the 
Space Program. The casino example defies this distinction, 
but is equally unrelated to "Congress' unique obligation 
toward the Indians."152 
By this reasoning, the court suggested that the agency’s interpretation 
would subject the Reindeer Act to strict scrutiny as a racial classification, 
and indicated that it would be struck down as unconstitutional.153 The 
analysis in this case seems to be consistent with both the holding and 
reasoning behind the Mancari decision. But, as set forth above, other courts 
have used Mancari more broadly, treating it as a rubber stamp to insulate 
a variety of laws, rules, and programs that rely on Indian status 
classifications—often to extend preferential treatment to individual Indians 
over members of other racial groups.154  
The general takeaway here, as in the above section, is inconsistent 
reasoning and results. Once outside the realm of federal legislation touching 
on core tribal interests, courts have found freedom to treat Indian status as 
a racial classification subject to strict scrutiny, or treat it as a political 
classification (that is, apply Morton v. Mancari) subject only to rational-
basis review, to reach a desired outcome or uphold a preferred policy. There 
                                                 
 
151  Id. at 665. 
152  Id.  
153  Id. at 665–66.  
154  See, e.g., supra notes. 119-122, 127-131, and accompanying text.   
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is not a consistent underlying logic beyond this. Treating, for example, 
preferences and special programs for individual Indians—members of a U.S. 
Census Bureau-designated race—as a political classification, but then 
treating a state’s funding to the Navajo Nation—one of the tribal entities 
that justifies the racial/political distinction—as a decision impermissibly 
made based on racial categorization in Navajo Nation v. New Mexico, can 
only be rectified by looking to preferences for certain policies and 
outcomes.155  
C.  “Indian” Status in ICWA 
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is deserving of individual 
treatment in this section, as it represents a situation where Indian status 
is more appropriately cast as a political classification. 
ICWA is a remedial statute that “establish[es] minimum Federal 
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families.”156 ICWA 
uses the Indian status of a child involved in custody, adoption, and removal 
proceedings as a trigger for its provisions. It was enacted to combat the 
“wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes,” after Congress 
found that “an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were being] 
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them 
by nontribal public and private agencies.”157 Among other provisions, ICWA 
dictates a preference for placement of an Indian child with a family member, 
a member of the child’s tribe, or other Indian families.158 
Indian status under ICWA is appropriately viewed as a political 
classification, because the Indian status classification is a means by which 
the interests of Indian tribes and the larger Indian community are 
represented. ICWA serves Indian tribes—political entities. Leading up to 
the creation of ICWA, Congress had found “that there is no resource that is 
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than 
their children.”159 This is evidenced in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.160 In tracing the purposes 
and background of ICWA, the Court quoted Congressional hearing 
testimony that emphasized the tribal interests at stake: 
                                                 
 
155  See Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 1979); Navajo Nation v. New Mexico, 975 
F.2d 741, 743 (10th Cir. 1992).  
156  25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
157  25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2012).  
158  Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 643 (2013). 
159  25 U.S.C. § 1901(3). 
160  490 U.S. 30 (1989).   
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Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly 
reduced if our children, the only real means for the 
transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-
Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their 
People. Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut 
the tribes’ ability to continue as self-governing 
communities. Probably in no area is it more important that 
tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially 
and culturally determinative as family relationships.161 
The Act was recognized as not only “protecting the rights of the 
Indian child as an Indian,” but also the “rights of the Indian community and 
tribe in retaining its children in its society.”162 The case that called for 
application of ICWA in Holyfield involved twin children born to an Indian 
mother and father, two-hundred miles from the parents’ tribe’s Mississippi 
Choctaw Reservation on which the parents resided. The mother of the 
children intentionally gave birth to the children off of the reservation, 
voluntarily surrendered custody of the children, and, along with the father, 
gave written, advanced consent to adoption of the children by the 
prearranged, non-Indian adoptive mother, Vivian Holyfield.163 The adoption 
proceedings were conducted in state court. When the tribe tried to intervene 
in the adoption, both birth parents affirmed their desire that Holyfield 
adopt their children.164 All of this was done in an apparent attempt to place 
the children with Holyfield, and escape the application of ICWA.165 
Nonetheless, the Court’s majority held that the Mississippi Choctaw tribe 
had exclusive jurisdiction over the children’s adoption.166 The Court 
explained that:    
Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be 
defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe, 
for Congress was concerned not solely about the interests 
of Indian children and families, but also about the impact 
on the tribes themselves of the   large numbers of Indian 
                                                 
 
161 Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted).  
162 Id. at 37 (internal citations omitted).  
163 Id. at 37-38.  
164 Id. at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
165 Id., at 39-40 (Brennan, J., majority opinion). 
166 Id., at 53-54.  
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children adopted by non-Indians. . . . The numerous 
prerogatives accorded the tribes through the ICWA's 
substantive provisions . . . must, accordingly, be seen as a 
means of protecting not only the interests of individual 
Indian children and families, but also of the tribes 
themselves. . . . Permitting individual members of the tribe 
to avoid tribal exclusive jurisdiction by the simple 
expedient of giving birth off the reservation would, to a 
large extent, nullify the purpose the ICWA was intended to 
accomplish.167 
Thus, Holyfield stands for the idea that ICWA affords Indian tribes, 
themselves, a set of vested rights that are unique and tailored to their 
interests, and separate from the rights and interests of individual, tribal-
member Indians. ICWA’s use of Indian status is what gives Indian tribes 
the opportunity to exercise their unique rights, and pursue interests of the 
Indian tribe and Indian community as a whole, not just the interests of 
individuals with Indian blood who happen to be members of an Indian tribe.  
Viewing Indian status as a political classification under ICWA is also 
appropriate because of the act’s definition of “Indian” and “Indian child.” 
Some legislation leaves terms like “Indian” undefined, or otherwise offer no 
substantive guidance in determining Indian status. Determination of 
Indian status under the Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act is not 
guided by a clear definition, and decisions on Indian status under these acts 
are made by non-exhaustive, multi-factor balancing tests that are 
formulated and applied in different manners by different courts and in 
different cases.168 Under ICWA, an “Indian” is “any person who is a member 
of an Indian tribe or who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional 
Corporation,” and an “Indian child” is a “person who is under age eighteen 
and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership 
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe.”169 These definitions make specific reference to the political prong of 
Indian status—tribal membership. Under ICWA, only tribal members, or 
enrollment-eligible children of tribal members, qualify for Indian status.  
Given the clear expression of an Indian tribe’s—not just an Indian 
individual’s—interests represented in ICWA, along with definitions that 
hinge on tribal affiliation and not just Indian blood, challenges to ICWA 
                                                 
 
167 Id. at 49, 52.  
168 See supra text accompanying notes 34–79. 
169 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3)–(4) (2012). 
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appear to be prime candidates for application of Morton v. Mancari. In 
comparison to other cases that have followed Mancari, Indian status in 
ICWA presents more clearly as a political, rather than racial, classification, 
as the distinction has been made and understood by courts. This may come 
up in the next few years, as a number of criticisms have recently been 
directed at ICWA.170 In fact, a handful of cases—including a class action 
funded, directed, and highly publicized by the Goldwater Institute—have 
challenged ICWA on grounds of Equal Protection and racial discrimination. 
However, they have largely been dismissed for lack of standing.171 Although 
ICWA has not been conclusively tested on the merits in this new round of 
challenges, it appears that ICWA exemplifies characteristics that justify 
treating its use of Indian status as a political classification, rather than a 
racial one. These characteristics can be applied to inform future 
congressional acts making use of Indian status—such as clear definitions 
that reference tribal membership or affiliation; congressional testimony, 
reports, and purpose statements that highlight the representative interests 
of Indian tribes and the general Indian community; and an active role for 
tribal governments in representing their own interests and furthering the 
statutory scheme.  
III. THE SENSIBILITY OF CURRENT INDIAN-STATUS 
DETERMINATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES  
A.  Merits of the Current Scheme 
Marilyn Vann framed her position in the Cherokee Freedmen debate 
as the question of whether the Cherokee Nation is “a race or a nation?”172 
This presentation of the question as a true dichotomy may have been a 
heartfelt contention on the part of Vann and the Freedmen. Perhaps it is 
more appropriate under the unique circumstances of the Freedmen debate, 
given that it involves an internal racial classification, to be made within a 
single Indian tribe. However, if taken as a question of the treatment of 
Indian status as a whole, it represents a gross oversimplification of the 
                                                 
 
170 See also George Will, The Indian Child Welfare Act Puts Identity Politics Above Children’s Safety, 
NATIONAL REVIEW, Sept. 3, 2015, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/423460/indian-child-welfare-
act-puts-identity-politics-above-childrens-safety-george-will; Clint Bolick, The Wrongs We Are Doing 
Native American Children, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/wrongs-we-are-
doing-native-american-children-389771.  
171 See Nat’l Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, 733 (E.D. Va. 2015); A.D. v. 
Washburn, No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38060, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 
2017), vacated, No. 17-155839, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21721 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018).  
172 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.  
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history and policy of U.S.-Indian relations, and the flexibility needed in legal 
treatment of said history and policy.  
The two-prong categorization of Indian status serves both 
convenience and necessity. It allows the government to regulate, burden, or 
extend benefits and preferences to Indians and Indian tribes, where it would 
not be appropriate to do so with other groups of citizens. When a desirable 
program is challenged, courts can uphold Indian status as a political 
classification. If actions are taken to the detriment of Indians or Indian 
tribes, courts can engage in mental gymnastics, or ignore prior case law 
altogether, in reaching a decision that nonetheless reflects reality—that is, 
that Indian status is inherently racial, even if tied to smoldering embers of 
a former sovereignty.173 Courts and legislatures alike are able to 
conveniently define Indian status in racial terms, while simultaneously 
asserting that their actions are consistent with equal protection principles 
because Indian status is political, rather than racial. What this means, 
however, is that Indian status is a non-uniform, contextual, and shifting 
classification; from case to case, its application may turn on questionable 
factual distinctions and conclusions. And it is far from guaranteed that an 
individual judge will hold a positive view of tribal sovereignty and interests.  
For the time being, the seemingly incoherent legal treatment of 
Indian status is coherent in what it accomplishes—namely: convenience, 
flexibility, and necessity in reaching desired outcomes or upholding policy 
preferences. Flexibility and convenience, however, do not provide long-term 
security. By affording courts and Congress the ability to mold conceptions 
of Indian status based on policy preferences and convenience, tribes and 
individual Indians are subject to potential shifts or inconsistencies in the 
preferences of individual judges and subsequent legislatures.   
 
 
B.  An Alternative Approach: Emphasizing the Federal 
Relationship to the Sovereign Tribes that Justified the 
Political Classification in Mancari   
                                                 
 
173 On the wavering and diminished nature of tribal sovereignty possessed by the “domestic, dependent 
[Indian] nations,” see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“The sovereignty that the 
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress 
and is subject to complete defeasance . . . by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result 
of their dependent status.”) superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (1983 & Supp. 1998), as 
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).  
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An alternative approach would be to rely more heavily on the status 
of tribes as sovereign political entities and less on racial conceptions of 
Indian status. Accordingly, criminal jurisdiction would hinge solely on 
official recognition of the defendant as an Indian by the tribe, and civil 
legislation would have to be related to tribal interests and directed at tribal 
members to enjoy insulation from review, under Mancari. This would better 
respect the Supreme Court’s landmark yet illusory holding in Williams v. 
Lee, recognizing “the right of the Indians to govern themselves” as sovereign 
nations.174 Of course, skeptics may note that tribes could gain significant 
non-Indian membership and place a strain on the federal government in 
requiring more federal funding and federal attention. Opponents might 
otherwise conjure up ideas by which tribes game a newfound discretion to 
determine membership, free of worries about continuing political vitality 
and average blood-quantum. These claims, however, are likely rebuked by 
reality. Although some tribes require only a showing of lineal descent from 
an original tribal member for enrollment, a number of other tribes restrict 
the enrollment of those with lineal descent from original tribal members 
and some degree of Indian blood by imposing ranging levels of minimum 
blood quantum requirements.175 Many tribal governments now operate just 
as much (or more) as business conglomerates, as they do sovereign rulers.176 
The recent trend has been for tribes to move beyond already lucrative 
gaming and mineral enterprises and into manufacturing plants, commercial 
real estate leasing, pharmaceutical companies, and factories.177 Tribes 
                                                 
 
174  Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 
n.32 (1978) (“A tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been 
recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community.”). 
175 Compare Membership/CDIB, THE OSAGE NATION, https://www.osagenation-nsn.gov/what-we-
do/cdib-membership (“The Osage Nation Membership Department issues membership cards for 
individuals showing lineal descent from an Osage listed on the base roll created pursuant to the 
Osage Allotment Act of 1906.”) (last visited Sept. 6, 2018), with Enrollment, THE MISSISSIPPI BOARD 
OF CHOCTAW INDIANS, http://www.choctaw.org/government/tribalServices/members/enrollment.html 
(explaining that the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians requires that a prospective enrollee have 
one-half or more Choctaw blood quantum, and be born to an enrolled member of the tribe) (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2018). Tribes employing a minimum-blood quantum typically range from one-half to 
one-sixteenth blood requirements. 
176 See Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law 
and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 1–2 (Harvard University. Faculty Research, Working Paper No., 
RWP04-016, 2004); David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, Robert A Williams, Jr., Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 24 (6th ed., 2011). 
177 See id. 
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likely have an interest in limiting their membership, to limit the dispersion 
of the funds generated from casinos, oil and gas leases, lumber and mineral 
resources, and tribal enterprises. This tribal interest likely coincides with 
federal interests in limiting the amount of federal funds expended as part 
of the unique federal government relationship with Indian tribes, and the 
Indians within them. Indeed, the more recent concern has been tribal 
disenrollment of members—with some cases bringing allegations of 
economic and financial motives behind the disenrollment.178  
In the criminal context for individual defendants, this would mean 
getting rid of the Rogers racial/political prongs and relying more simply on 
tribal enrollment or other official recognition (which usually itself requires 
some quantum of racial "Indian blood"). For the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v. Antelope to mean what it says, the only proper inquiry is 
whether a criminal defendant is officially affiliated with a tribe.179  
In the civil context, federal legislation, in order to be subject to 
rational basis review as a political classification under Mancari, would have 
to bear relation to Congress' authority to deal with tribes, and tribal 
members, under the Indian Commerce Clause and federal trust 
relationship. This would preserve legislation that regulates tribal economic 
development/enterprises,180 serves tribal continuity and vitality,181 or 
promotes self-government.182  
Federal legislation that extends differential treatment to Native 
Americans more generally and lacks a strong tie to tribal interests would be 
subject to heightened scrutiny. This was the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                 
 
178  See, e.g., Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic: 
In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 409 (2015).  
179  430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (holding that the defendants “were not subjected to federal criminal 
jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled members of the Coeur 
d’Alene tribe.”).  
180  California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216–217 (1987) (recognizing that 
encouraging tribal economic development is an “important federal interest” and promotes larger 
goals of tribal self-government and independence), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 2701, as 
recognized in Michigan v. Bay Hills Indian Cmty., No.12-515 (May 27, 2014).  
181  See supra text accompanying notes 137–149 (explaining that ICWA is such an act, ensuring that 
tribes can maintain their population base and cultural life). 
182 In Mancari, the Supreme Court found that the BIA employment preference furthered self-
government, given the role of the BIA in managing tribes and Indian affairs. See Morton v. Mancari, 
417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974). The more clear-cut example of self-government would be legislation that 
shifts jurisdiction and regulation from state/federal government, to the tribes themselves.  
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decision in Williams v. Babbitt—that Mancari only shields “uniquely Indian 
interests.”183 For example, a program that extends benefits to individuals 
that identify as Native American but live off-reservation and are not 
enrolled in federally-recognized tribes, might draw a heightened standard 
of review. The “tribal” or “sovereign” interests in such a situation are 
tenuous, as the individuals benefitting from the classification would lack a 
non-racial link to tribal governments.  
Any independent state legislation that does not descend from a 
federal program or federal treaty obligation would be subject to strict 
scrutiny, because states do not possess the same plenary authority over 
Indian affairs as U.S. Congress.184  
This approach would limit the realm in which Congress and states can 
legislate. Critics would likely argue that it overlooks the legitimate interest 
that government may have in remedying past injustices that operate 
against individual Native Americans, as members of a racial group. The 
basis for such a claim is founded upon the role of federal government as a 
trustee, within the federal-tribal trust relationship. But the Supreme Court 
has been increasingly skeptical of the idea that special treatment of a racial 
group is consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection principles.185  
C.  An Alternative Approach: Transparent Balancing that 
Reflects the Unique Quasi-Sovereign, Quasi-Racial Aspects 
of Indian Status 
Criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Mancari, the federal 
district court in KG Urban Enterprises offered that, if approaching the issue 
as one of first impression, it would: 
treat Indian tribal status as a quasi-political, quasi-racial 
classification subject to varying levels of scrutiny 
depending on the authority making it and the interests at 
                                                 
 
183  Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (showing that this perceivably would limit 
the ability of government to engage in differential treatment of individuals identifying as Native 
American who live outside of tribal reservations and are not enrolled in federally-recognized tribes). 
But see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the Reservation Borders, 12 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 1003, 1041 (2008) (arguing that such treatment would fall within Congress’ power 
as a trustee, in the scope of the federal-tribal trust relationship).   
184  See Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 422 (Alaska 2003). 
185  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
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stake. Federal laws relating to native land, tribal status or 
Indian culture would require minimal review because such 
laws fall squarely within the historical and constitutional 
authority of Congress to regulate core Indian affairs. Laws 
granting gratuitous Indian preferences divorced from 
those interests . . . would be subject to more searching 
scrutiny.186 
This aside from the court picked up where the Ninth Circuit left off 
in Williams v. Babbitt, holding that only legislation involving “uniquely 
Indian interests” is shielded from searching review.187 Perhaps the more 
feasible approach, reflecting the broad context in which federal and state 
governments interact with tribes and their citizens, is a flexible framework 
of multifactor balancing. And the Supreme Court’s adoption of a flexible 
level of scrutiny to accommodate unique circumstances would not be a novel 
break from its existing caselaw.188 
   Three factors seem pertinent in this framework. The first, and 
heaviest, would be the strength of the tribal interests at stake—whether the 
classification involves uniquely Indian interests in self-government, 
economic development, or continuity of tribal culture. The second factor 
would be whether the classification is aimed at remedying specific 
aftereffects of federal mismanagement towards tribes and Indians, or 
simply confers a benefit upon those with Native American ancestry. This 
gives due heed to the idea that the federal government, in the exercise of its 
trust obligation, should have the authority and flexibility to correct the error 
in its past policies.189 The third factor, related to the second, involves the 
                                                 
 
186  KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 404 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part by KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). The First Circuit did not 
otherwise raise objections to the district court’s criticism of Mancari. 
187  115 F.3d at 665. 
188  See Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1043, 
1057, 1046–47 (2017) (identifying five de facto tiers of scrutiny employed by the court, such as the 
use of “strict scrutiny lite” in upholding explicit racial classifications in the context of higher 
education affirmative action).  
189  See, e.g., Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. L.J. 1, 64 (1995); Larry A. DiMatteo 
& Michael J. Meagher, Broken Promises: The Failure of the 1920’s Native American Irrigation and 
Assimilation Policies, 19 HAW.  L. REV. 1, 34 (1997) (supporting the idea that the government might 
have an interest in special housing and land acquisition programs for urban Indians that recognize 
the impact that assimilation and allotment policies had on the individual Indian, separate and apart 
from any modern connection to the tribe). 
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impact that the legislation has on individuals who belong to other racial 
groups—is it a program tailored to Indians and tribal interests, or is it a 
classification within a broader program or regulatory scheme that confers a 
competitive benefit on Indians, to the detriment of similarly-situated non-
Indians? This strikes a compromise between the history and continuing 
need for special legislation aimed at tribes and Indians as a unique, quasi-
racial quasi-political group, while still accounting for the core dictate of 
equal protection—that special attention is required when government 
engages in differential treatment, particularly on the basis of race.190 As one 
court has put it, the “breadth of the Federal power over Indian tribes and 
its resulting conflicts with equal protection theory require that the power 
be exercised with regard to its effect on non-Indians as well as Indians.”191 
This approach may be preferable to that of the preceding subsection, 
because it is more sensitive to the idea of government—federal, and perhaps 
state, in some contexts—enacting remedial legislation to address 
inequalities rooted in historical treatment of tribes and their citizens at the 
hands of government.  This allows for a broader role of the federal 
government in executing its role as a trustee to Indian tribes. But perhaps 
the most attractive aspect of this approach is that it would inject judicial 
transparency into the legal analysis of classifications based on Indian 
status. As the Ninth Circuit did in Williams v. Babbitt, courts would be 
required to take an open and honest inventory of the nature of the 
classification and the interests at stake.192 This could lead to more 
reasonable analysis—and thus allow legislators and tribes more 
predictability—than the current regime, which has treated the single 
political entity of the Navajo Nation as a racial classification, while treating 
individual Indians as the subject of a political classification, without any 
clarity of analysis. Perceivably, in these cases, courts have already been 
conducting this kind of balancing and weighing of interests—the calculus 
has just occurred behind the scenes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
190   E.g., Kornhass Constr. Inc. v. Okla. Dep’t of Cent. Serv., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1249 (W.D. Okla. 
2001). There, the court applied strict scrutiny to a state “bidding preference to American Indians,” as 
it was not clearly tied to Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indian tribes” or “furthering tribal 
self-government.” Id. 
191   State v. Zay Zah, 259 N.W. 2d 580, 591 (Minn. 1977).  
192   See 115 F.3d at 665. 
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CONCLUSION  
Whether correct or incorrect, consistent or incoherent from a legal 
perspective, applying both a racial and political prong to Indian status 
makes sense from a realist view. Divorced from the Cherokee Freedmen 
debate and applied generally, Chief Smith’s statement that “an Indian 
nation should be composed of Indians” seems inherently correct, even if the 
specific reasons cannot be fully articulated. The political prong is a nod to 
the fact that Indian tribes were once sovereign nations that contracted and 
made treaties with the United States (along with the Spanish, British, and 
French), in government-to-government relations. Initially by strategic or 
tactical choice, this sovereignty was never “extinguished” by, say, a decisive 
military conquest. This continuous (but modified and limited) sovereignty, 
and the resulting political prong of Indian status, differentiates Indians 
from other minority groups who, though subject to historical mistreatment 
and perhaps otherwise deserving of remedial legislation, have no such tie to 
a continuing sovereign entity—American descendants of Irish immigrants 
or Black slaves, for example, are subject to the political sovereignty of the 
United States alone, and have been so since the entrance (by force or by 
choice) of their ancestors into the borders of the United States. On the other 
hand, the continuing political sovereignty of Indian status is founded upon 
the existence of the racial prong. The history of each tribe is a history of the 
ancestors of its modern members, and without genealogical ties to these 
ancestors and their experiences, the basis for a special relationship between 
the federal government and Indians is lost. After all, it is not the Lakota 
Tribe that was massacred by U.S. soldiers at Wounded Knee, but rather 150 
individual Lakota tribal members. Nor was it the Navajo tribe that turned 
limited government provisions of flour, salt, and lard into the now-iconic 
frybread, but rather individual members of the Diné trying to survive the 
forced relocation march, or “Long Walk,” across the deserts of the 
Southwest. It is this genealogical and cultural heritage that lives on in 
individual Indians, and it is the decision of these individuals to maintain an 
“existence . . . as a separate and distinct people,” that fans the flames of 
continued tribal sovereignty.193  
 
                                                 
 
193 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 583 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring), abrogated by Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).  
